New York Civil Service Attorney Law Blog : New York Civil Service Lawyer & Attorney : Kevin P. Sheerin : Article 78 : Serving New York City, Long Island, Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island

As reported by Lisa Colangelo of the NY Daily News, New York City released a list of city exams that it plans to give over the next 12 months. These exams are for jobs ranging from a police officer and school safety to case workers, statistician and plasterers.

Civil service is great opportunity for job seeker, but test takers need to keep in mind that taking or even passing an exam does not guarantee a job. New York City is also making it easier to take the exams by offering a number of tests at the Department of Citywide Administrative Services Computerized Testing Centers. The exam fee ranges from $40 and higher and applicants must have a bachelor’s degree.

For more information regarding the upcoming exams, please got to www.nyc.gov/dcas

Read more at NY Daily News.

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Kevin Nowack was a firefighter working for Ridge Road Fire District and claimed that he injured his back in 2002 when a firetruck hit a “low spot” or manhole cover depression on a road. Nowack sought General Municipal Law 207-a[1} benefits for a line of duty injury. As required he prepared an “accident-sickness packet” The fire district reviewed the packet and denied him GML 207-a{1} benefits concluding that the line of duty injury he claimed was actually a pre-existing one. As per the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) Nowack requested a hearing to review the District’s denial of benefits. The CBA directed that a hearing be held pursuant to NYS Administrative Procedure Act and that “it is the empolye’s burden tto prove he is entitled to GML benefits.” Originally the hearing officer Michael Schiano ruled for the firefighter and wrote that the standard of review was whether substantial evidence was presented to override the District’s decision. When the District appealed the Supreme Court directed the hearing officer to decide whether the District’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence. Again the hearing officer ruled for the firefighter. When the district challenged the decision again the Supreme Court ruled for the District holding that the decision to deny benefits was supported by substantial evidence despite conflicting testimony in the record.

The issue was which decision must be supported by substantial evidence? 

The denial of GML 207-a benefits after the District’s review of Nowack’s “accident-sickness packet” or

The decision of the hearing officer that the District determination to deny benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. 

In a 4 -3 the majority held that the original decision of the District must be supported by substantial evidence. They wrote: “the parties here agree, and we therefore assume, that, as applied to his case, the statute requires the District’s denial of benefits to be upheld if substantial evidence supports it. Therefore, in accordance with this standard and in light of the CBA’s terms, the independent hearing officer was required to give deference to the District’s decision and Nowack bore the burden of establishing that the District’s denial determination had not be supported by substantial evidence.”

Judge Lippman writing for the three dissenting judges: “however, the majority is mistaken; the parties here are not in agreement as to whether the District’s initial determination to deny benefits was to be upheld if substantial evidence supported it. As the majority notes, state Administrative Procedure Act 306(1) … provides that the substantial evidence standard is to be applies “upon consideration of the record as a whole.” The record “as a whole” however, did not even exist at the time the District made is determination; rather, the record was created at the hearing conducted by the hearing officer.” 

The dissent opined that the Hearing Officer’s decision to allow GML 207-a benefits should be reinstated. 

Opinion: In CPLR Article 78 the “substantial evidence” standard is applied when a hearing has been conducted but in this case it was applied to the “accident-sickness packet” process. Would review of paperwork bepreferable to review of a full hearing with all paperwork and additionally evidence from doctors and witnesses?

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Both parties have started separate legal proceedings to have the Town Land Use Board of Appeal decision thrown out. The Land Use Board of Appeals determined which ruled that the “addition of an asphalt batch plant to a nonconforming quarry is an expansion of mining and requires a special use permit from the Planning Board of the town of Russia.” 

The first petition was filed in early March by 14 residents living near the proposed asphalt plant. The “citizens’ petition” is requesting the court prevent the town planning board from making a decision based on the appeals board’s determination. Also, they are requesting that Respondents, Material Sand and Troy Sand and Gravel, be prohibited from constructing and operating a plant there.

The second petition, “the company’s petition,” was filed on behalf of Material Sand and Troy Sand and Gravel requesting that the Land Use Board of Appeals’ decision be dismissed due to “pre-existing nonconforming use consisted not only of ‘mining’ bt also related aggregate product manufacturing” and for the court to allow the construction of an asphalt plant without the issuance of a special use permit.

Read full article here.

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In the Matter of Department of Correction v Stanley Saint-Phard

In this disciplinary proceeding, pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Service Law, Respondent, a Correction Officer, allegedly used impermissible force against an inmate by dispersing a chemical agent in the inmate’s face and also placed the inmate in a chokehold.

On October 16, 2008, Eric Smith, an inmate at George Motchan Detention Center was mopping up an area near the A station. Respondent entered the area and asked Smith to return to his cell. After some conversation between the two, Respondent dispersed oleoresin capsicum (“OC”) spray towards Smith’s face. Then Smith began to leave the room when Respondent grabbed him and walked him to the front of the A station wall. Smith began to remove one of his hands from the wall when Respondent brought him to the ground and restrained him.

There were several testimonies by witnesses, but the crucial evidence in this case was the videotape of the incident. The videotape did not have sound, but it depicts that Smith’s hands were behind his back when Respondent used the OC spray within a the three feet radius and is also shows that Respondent’s left arm was around Smith’s neck and he maintained that hold while forcing him to the floor.

First, the video evidence showed that Smith was compliant and not aggressive immediately prior to being sprayed and contradicts Respondent’s written statement. Respondent use of the OC spray was prohibited under the Directive 4501R-E. Directive 4501R-E states that “that dispersal of hand-held chemical agents is authorized to defend oneself, another employee, inmate or visitor, to maintain the safety and security of the facility, or to enforce Department rules where necessary to promote the good order and safety of the facility.” Also, Respondent use of the OC spray was impermissible because the directive states that use the spray in less than three feet away from the intended target because spraying the OC spray in close range can cause severe eye and skin irritation or other injuries.

Second, Respondent’s written statement he maintained that he put Smith in an upper body control hold. However, in. the videotape showed that Respondent pushed Smith up against the wall and then put his arm around Smith’s neck. Directive 5006R-C § V (C) prohibits the use of the chokehold except in situations where there is deadly physical force. According to Directive 5006R-C § V (C), you are allowed to use deadly physical when there is no other reasonable alternative to stop or prevent an escape, or when an officer must “defend him/herself of another person from what he/she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of Deadly Physical Force by the inmate.” Respondent’s use of the chokehold was unnecessary and is constituted as excessive force.

Lastly, Respondent written statement and use of force report was false and misleading and he submitted the report approximately eleven days after the incident, on October 27, 2008. When an officer is in a use of force incident, a report must be submitted before leaving the facility on the day of the incident. The only exception to this is if you are injured than the use of force report can be submitted at a later time. Respondent claimed that he sustained an injury during the use of force incident and was immediately taken to the hospital. Respondent acknowledges that he may have been back to work before October 27, but cannot provide any plausible reason as why he did not submitted the use of force report earlier.

The Administrative Law Judge has come to the following conclusions: (1) although there was no evidence of actual choking, the use of pressure around someone’s neck can potentially cause serious or even fatal consequences; (2) the use of the OC spray at a close range is also dangerous because of the risk of retinal damage with a pre-existing condition; and (3) submission of a late and misleading use of force report is wrong. Due to Respondent have no prior disciplinary record during his five years as a Correction Officer, it is recommended that Respondent be suspended for 60 days.

Read more about this case here.

To read about more similar cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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In the Matter of Jerome Skrine v New York City Department/ Board of Education

Petitioner brought this Article 78 proceeding to seek to compel Respondents to accept the revocation of his resignation.

On October 31, 2008, Petitioner resigned from his position as a tenured special education teacher. In a letter dated June 10, 2010, Petitioner stated that he wanted to revoke his resignation. However, the Board of Education refused verbally. Petitioner went on to admit that he resigned in October 2008 while there were disciplinary charges that were pending against him and the Board of Education did not grant him his due process.

Petitioner also maintained that this Article 78 proceeding is timely because “…the statue of limitations runs from the rejection of the revocation itself, which occurred in June 2010.” Under the Chancellor Regulation C-205(28), Petitioner claimed that he allowed “…to revoke his resignation within five years of the resignation, BOE is mandated to accept the revocation.”

The Court ruled that Petitioner’s action to revoke his resignation in October 2008 was barred by the four month status of limitations. Therefore, any claims Petitioner made after March 2009 was barred.

The court decided to grants the Respondent’s cross motion to dismiss on the ground that the statue of limitations expired and for failure to state a cause of action was granted. The petition was denied and the proceeding was dismissed.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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Court Confirms Petitioner’s Termination for Misconduct.

Matter of Gibbons v. New York Unified Ct. Sys., Off. of Ct. Admin.

In this Article 78 case, Petitioner, Grace Gibbons, sought review of Respondent’s decision that found her guilty of incompetence and misconduct and terminated her employment.

Gibbons was a court reporter for the District Court in Nassau County for approximately 22 years. In May 2007, Respondent served Gibbons with a notice of disciplinary charges. At the hearing, the Office of Court Administration (OCA) stated that Petitioner was insubordinate to supervisors and a District Court Judge, failed to produce transcripts in a timely matter, and was excessively absent without sufficient notice, which left the District Court short notice to find a replacement.

In December 2008, the hearing officer recommended that Petitioner be terminated from his position. A few months later, on February 4, 2009, the Deputy Chief Administrative Judge found the Petitioner guilty of the misconduct and incompetent in at least 20 specifications. Thereafter, Gibbons was terminated.

In an Article 78 proceeding, the Appellate review is limited to whether that determination was supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact” and “[t]he courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [an administrative agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists.”

The Appellate Division found that the decision was supported by substantial evidence and the penalty of termination did not shock one’s sense of fairness.

The determination was confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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Retirement Benefits Denied Due to Substantial Evidence Presented by New York State

In the Matter of Stephen C. Caruana v. Thomas P. DiNapoli, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al..

Petitioner, Stephen C. Caruana, sought to review a decision of Respondent which denied his application for accidental disability retirement benefits.

In March 2006, Petitioner, a police officer, applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. Caruana claimed that he was permanently incapacitated due to neck and back injuries that were a result of three work-related incidents. Initially, his application was denied and petitioner requested a redetermination, therefore, a hearing was held. The Hearing Officer concluded that Petitioner “…failed to establish that such incapacity was caused by either 1987 incident or the 2003 incident, resulting in the denial of his application, an Article 78 followed.

The Appellate Division stated that the Petitioner has the burden of proving that his injuries were the results of the alleged incidents and in deciding whether Petitioner has fulfilled this burden, Respondent is entitled to produce “…conflicting medical evidence and to credit the opinion of one expert…” over the other.

In 2007, Petitioner had an orthopedic surgeon perform a spinal fusion surgery who agreed that Caruana condition was related to the 1987 incident and a chiropractor who agreed that his disability is related to the 1987 and 2003 incidents. Respondents brought in a board certified surgeon, Austin Leve, to examine Petitioner and review his medical records in August 2006. Leve concluded that Caruana’s injuries were not significant enough of an injury to permanently incapacitate him.

The court concluded that Respondent’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore the decision was confirmed, without costs and the petition is dismissed.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

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In the Matter of Thomas Hughes v. New York Unified Court System, Office of Court Administration.

Pursuant to Article 78, Thomas Hughes, Petitioner, sought to review a decision of Respondent which adopted the recommendation of a hearing officer, who found that “…the petitioner engaged in acts of misconduct and incompetency prejudicial to the good or and efficiency of the New York State Unified Court System and adversely reflecting on his fitness to continue as a court officer…,” which resulted in his termination.

In February, 2007, Respondents filed administrative charges against Petitioner. Hughes requested a hearing, where a hearing officer found that Petitioner had accelerated his vehicle “...while it was in close proximity to his supervisor as the supervisor was entering a crosswalk, reported late for duty several times, was repeatedly insubordinate to several supervisors, failed to keep his uniform in proper condition, failed to keep his weapon properly loaded, and kept an impermissible metal-jacketed round in his weapon, which was capable of piercing courthouse walls.

In October of the next year, the Office of Court Administration ordered that Petitioner be terminated from his position. By February, 2009, Hughes filed this appeal. According the Appellate Division, an administrative decision made after a hearing mandated by law is limited to whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence “…relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact…”

The court concluded that the decision was support was substantial evidence and that the penalty of termination of employment is not disproportionate to the misconduct as to shock the conscience.

The petition was denied and the proceeding was dismissed with costs.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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Application for Pistol License Denied Due to Criminal History

In the Matter of Ralph Velez, Jr. v Robert M DiBella

Pursuant to Article 78, petitioner appealed a determination by the respondent denying his application for a pistol license.

According to Penal Law § 400.00(1), to be eligible for a pistol license, the applicant must be at least 21 years of age, have good moral character with no prior felony convictions or any other serious offense and there must be no good cause for denial of the license. Also, the pistol licensing officer may use his broad discretion and deny any applicant for any good cause.

Due to the petitioner’s criminal history, which consisted of six arrests and a conviction for disorderly conduct, the respondent determined that good cause existed to deny his application. Even though five of the six arrests were dismissed or resolved, the respondent still considered the circumstances surrounding each arrest.

Petitioner claims that the respondent acted improperly handing over his decision-making authority to the Westchester Department of Public Safety. However, the Westchester Department of Public Safety only provided the respondent with a recommendation of denial. In the respondent’s written decision, it clearly shows that the Department’s recommendation was not the sole basis for denying the petitioner’s application for a pistol license.

The court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding without costs or disbursements.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78

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In the Matter of Kyle P. McDonell v New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, et al.

In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner asked the court to review a determination suspending his license for refusal to submit to a chemical test.

McDonell was stopped by a NYS Trooper because he accelerated while turning onto an entrance ramp for an interstate highway causing his vehicle to fishtail. The Trooper’s sole basis for stopping McDonell was his belief that McDonell violated VTL § 1162. This law forbids dangerously moving a stopped, standing or parked vehicle unless it can be made with safety. Petitioner was taken into custody because of the Trooper’s belief that the petitioner was under the influence while operating the vehicle. Soon thereafter, because the petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test, his license was suspended.

VTL § 1194 (2) (c), in a refusal revocation hearing, the law judge concluded that the Trooper lawfully arrested the petitioner. However, the court agreed with the petitioner’s contention that he had not been stopped, standing or parked before the Trooper stopped the vehicle. It was held that it was an illegal stop based on VTL § 1162.

The refusal suspension was annulled based on the improper stop.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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In the Matter of Eastern Oaks Development v Town of Clinton, et al.

In this Article 78 case, petitioner, Eastern Oaks Development, asked the court to review a decision of Clinton where petitioner was denied their application to have its road accepted for dedication by the Town of Clinton.

In 2005, petitioner applied with the Town of Clinton Planning Board for approval of a residential subdivision that contained eleven lots. Petitioner stated they did not intend to builds any homes on the lots and that it was up to the purchasers to build their own homes. A few months later, the Planning board granted the application for conditional final approval for the Subdivision. Planning Board stated that at least eighty percent of the construction must be done in the Subdivision in order for formal acceptance of the roads.

The Town Engineer wrote a letter to the Board pleading that they disapprove the road based on the fact that there was not eighty percent of construction done in the Subdivision. The Planning Board took this into consideration and declined  acceptance of the road stating that the Town Board disapprove of the dedication “…until there are sufficient houses constructed on the subdivision parcels.”

Petitioner, then commenced this Article 78 proceeding alleging the following: (1) the Town was aware that in order to attract potential purchasers it was necessary for the Town and Town Board to accept the dedication of the road; (2) before an actual vote took place, the Town Board already determined that they were going to decline the acceptance of the road by the influence of Budd, who had a interest of conflict; (3) Budd and the Town Engineer were good friends and they “collaborated and conspired to thwart the perfunctory approval of the road…”; (4) after a dispute between Eastern and Budd, Eastern has a dispute with the Town Engineer “... over baseless charges and has been advised that same threatened the Subdivision."

The Court denied the Town Parties motion to dismiss holding that Budd, although recused from the vote could have influenced it.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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NYPD Prior Probationary Service Counts Upon Reinstatement

Ward v  Kelly

Petitioner, Michael Ward, sought to annul a decision of the NYPD, to terminate him as a Probationary Police Officer on March 11, 2009.

In July 2006, Petitioner was originally appointed as a probationary police officer. Approximately nineteen months later, Ward resigned from his position in order to join the New York City Fire Department and less than a month later, on February 13, 2008, he resigned from the Fire Department and reapplied to the NYPD on the same day.

When Petitioner reapplied to the NYPD, he was required to sign a document called “Police Officer Terms of Probation,” which states that he was informed that there will be a twenty-four month probationary period. On February 21, 2008, Ward was appointed as a Probationary Police Officer. Upon appointment, Petitioner alleges that his probationary period would only last thirty-two days because he had started his probationary period on his initial appointment into the NYPD.

In December 2008, Petitioner was arrested for assault, menacing and harassment. Eventually, the charges were dropped, but as a Probationary Police Officer, Ward was terminated from the NYPD.

Petitioner argues that his initial probationary period should have been counted towards the two year probationary period, which ended in August 2008. Therefore, this would entitle Ward to a disciplinary hearing before his termination because he was no longer a Probationary Police Officer.

According to the Personnel Rules and Regulations of the City of New York, when “…a probationary employee has been separated from service, for any reason other than fault or delinquency, and is thereafter re-appointed by the same agency, the length of his prior probationary term shall be deducted from his current probationary term.”

The petition was granted and the decision terminating petitioner was vacated and rescinded. Petitioner will also be subject to such other disciplinary procedures applicable to him as a non-probationary police officer from his December 14, 2008 arrest.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

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Pitts II v City of New York Office of Comptroller

Pursuant to Article 78, petitioner sought the court to review a decision of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) stating that he had violated New York City Health Code.

Petitioner received a violation notice from the DOHMH which cited him for violations of the New York City Health Code. A DOHMH hearing examiner determined that petitioner had two violations and he would be fined $500 total. Petitioner brought suit but failed appeal the decision prior to suit.  Due to the petitioner not exhausting all administrative remedies the Supreme Court granted DOHMH’s motion to dismiss.

The court stated that in order for a proceeding to be litigate in a court of law, petitioner must exhaust all available administrative remedies

The Supreme Court ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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Matter of Michael MacLeod v Robert l. Megna, as Commissioner of Taxation and Finance

 In this Article 78 case, the court reviewed a decision of the Tax Appeal Tribunal which uphold sales and use tax assessment required under Tax Law articles 28 and 2.

Petitioner was the president and sole shareholder of MJM Studios of New York, Inc. This was a New Jersey company that specialized in creating architectural enhancements of buildings in numerous states.

Respondent informed petitioner that they would be conducting a field audit and required access to all MJM’s records. Petitioner could not provide access to the records because they were in possession of a bankruptcy trustee. The auditor made several attempt to contact the bankruptcy trustee and also made several more requests of petitioner to provide the records. After the unsuccessful attempts, the auditor calculated an estimated sales and use tax based on deposits in MJM’s bank records and he adjusted through MJM’s franchise tax returns to include only New York sales. Following a conference, the assessed amount was reduced. In addition to a hearing, the Department agreed to further reduce the assessed amount.

The Tax Appeal Tribunal affirmed the tax assessment. Due to a statutory presumption that all money received by MJM for products and services were taxable, petitioner has the burden of establishing by “clear and convincing evidence” that the money was not taxable and the assessment was erroneous. He failed to prove that the capital improvement exemption applies.

Even though the records were in possession of the trustee, there was no evidence that petitioner attempted to retrieve the records for the auditor.Due to the lack of documentation from petitioner, the auditor needed to come up with its own method to determine the tax assessment.

The determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

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In the Matter of Mark Scott v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Correctional Services, et al.

In this Article 78 cases, petitioner sought review of respondent’s conclusion which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

During a pat frisk of petitioner by a correction officer, petitioner seemed to have swallowed a foreign object that he was hiding in his mouth. He was, then, escorted to the hospital for an x-ray.

The x-ray revealed a razor blade wrapped in some type of material in his stomach. For the next few days, petitioner was placed on a contraband watch, but no razor blade turned up. In a misbehavior report, petitioner was charged with the following: (1) possessing a weapon, (2) possessing contraband, (3) violating search and frisk procedures and (4) possessing gang material. However, he was found of everything but of possessing gang material.

The determination was supported by the following substantial evidence: x-ray taken at the hospital, the misbehavior report, the testimony of the correction officer who authorized it, the testimony of the lieutenant who ordered the pat frisk, the testimony of the sergeant who was present at the pat frisk and the testimony of the nurse who reviewed the x-ray.

Petitioner, however, states that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence because the x-ray taken two days after the incident did not show any object in the petitioner stomach, nor was any contraband recovered.

The courts determination was confirmed, without costs, and petition was dismissed

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78

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Kifan Pak v New York City Department of Education

Petitioner, Kifan Pak, commenced this Article 78 proceeding to review the decision of respondent, New York City Department of Education, terminating him as a probationary teacher. Petitioner pursued an administrative appeal which resulted in the decision of termination being upheld. He then brought about this Article 78 appeal in Supreme Court. Respondents cross-moved to dismiss the petition arguing that it was time barred and the statute of limitations had expired.

Petitioner was informed of his termination by letter dated February 21, 2007. Petitioner immediately pursued an administrative appeal and received the determination to sustain the recommendation of termination by letter dated September 11, 2007. Petitioner then commenced the Article 78 appeal to vacate the decision on January 15, 2008. CPLR Section 217 states that an Article 78 proceeding to challenge an administrative decision must be commenced within four months after the determination becomes final. The internal administrative review did not extend petitioner’s limitation period because it is merely a procedural contractual right and not a constitutional or statutory right.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted respondent’s cross-motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred and dismissed the petition.

To read further on this topic go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

For other interesting information in the personal injury file go to www.negligenceatty.com.

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