NY Public Personnel Law on Whistleblower case

 The always informative NY Public Personnel law blog on a recent whistleblower case:

Arbitrator’s refusal to hear employee’s “whistle blower” defense in the course of disciplinary hearing requires the vacating of the award

 
Arbitrator’s refusal to hear employee’s “whistle blower” defense in the course of disciplinary hearing requires the vacating of the award

Matter of Kowaleski v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 2010 NY Slip Op 09379, Decided on December 21, 2010, Court of Appeals

Barbara Kowaleski, a correction officer employed by the New York State Department of Corrections, was served with disciplinary charges alleging that she violated provisions of the employees' manual on three separate occasions when she "made inappropriate comments of a personal nature about another staff member in the presence of staff and inmates"; argued with a fellow employee; and was "disrespectful and insubordinate" when she ignored a superior's order.
The proposed penalty: termination and the loss of any accrued leave.

Ultimately the matter was submitted to a disciplinary arbitration.

At the outset of the hearing, Kowaleski argued that the disciplinary action was only being brought to retaliate against her for reporting a fellow officer's misconduct and that she was entitled to raise this as an affirmative defense pursuant to Civil Service Law §75-b, contending that §75-b prohibits public employers from retaliating against employees for reporting their coworkers' improper conduct.

The arbitrator determined that because the Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA] limited his authority "to determinations of guilt or innocence and the appropriateness of proposed penalties," he lacked authority to consider Kowaleski's retaliation defense. The arbitrator, however, indicated that he would consider evidence of retaliation when determining witness credibility and "in the larger context of guilt or innocence."

The arbitrator found Kowaleski guilty of two of the three charges and determined that termination was appropriate and Kowaleski filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR seeking to have the award vacated.

Although Supreme Court and the Appellate Division rejected Kowaleski’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings “[b]ecause we find that the arbitrator's failure to separately consider and determine Kowaleski's affirmative defense of retaliation on the merits requires the award to be vacated”

The Court of Appeals explained that an arbitration award must be vacated if, as relevant here, a party's rights were impaired by an arbitrator who "exceeded his power or so imperfectly executed it that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made (see CPLR 7511 [b] [1] [iii]). Further, said the court, an arbitrator "exceed[s] his power" under the meaning of the statute where his "award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power."

As the lower courts found, and Correction conceded, the arbitrator “not only had authority to consider Kowaleski's retaliation defense, but was required to do so.”

Further, the opinion indicates that Civil Service Law §75-b prohibits a public employer from taking disciplinary action to retaliate against an employee for reporting "improper governmental action" and in the event the employee reasonably believes disciplinary action would not have been taken “but for" the whistle blowing, the employee may assert such as a defense before the designated arbitrator or hearing officer."

Whatever the terms of the CBA, the Court of Appeals said that
"[t]he merits of such defense shall be considered and determined as part of the arbitration award or hearing officer decision." Further, should the arbitrator or hearing officer find that the disciplinary action is based “solely on the employer's desire to retaliate,” the disciplinary proceeding must be dismissed.

Accordingly, the arbitrator's finding that he did not have authority under the CBA to consider Kowaleski's retaliation defense was not only incorrect as a matter of law, but also in excess of an explicit limitation on his power. Because he failed to consider and determine the defense, the court ruled that the award must be vacated.

Finally, the Court of Appeals noted the Kowaleski has requested that any rehearing be before a different arbitrator. That request, said the court, should be ruled on by Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09379.htm
 

Court questions if Petitioner was financially capable of "equally sharing" arbitration fees

Matter of Lorrainer C. Brady v The Williams Capital Group, L. P.

In this Article 78 case, the question is whether the petitioner was financially capable of sharing arbitration fees and costs.

 

In 1999, the respondent hired petitioner to sell fixed income securities. As a requirement for the position, petition needed to complete a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration to Transfer in order to become registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Upon registration, petitioner was no subject to the NASD rules.

 

In 2000, respondent created an employee manual and each employee was required to sign and follows and condition set aside in the manual. The employee manual included a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims,” which states that all disputes will be arbitrated and each party will equally share the fees and costs of the arbitrator.

 

Approximately five years later, in February 2005, petitioner was terminated from her position at The Williams Group. Following her termination, petitioner filed a discrimination complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. However, eight months later, before a decision was made, petitioner withdrew her complaint. In December of the same year, petitioner filed a Demand for Arbitration with American Arbitration Association. She was seeking money damages against the respondent. Petitioner claimed that her termination of employment at the Williams Group was in violation of her Civil Rights.

 

According to the AAA rules, employers were required to pay all arbitration fees. Therefore, AAA decided on behalf of the petitioner and sent an invoice for $42,300 to the respondent. Respondent refused to pay the entire amount due to the Williams Group arbitration agreement in the employees’ manual.

 

Pursuant to Article 78, petitioner sought to force respondent to pay the fees or to force AAA to issue a judgment on respondent for failure to cooperate.

 

The Appellate Division sided with the petitioner because they found that respondent “equal share” provision in the agreement was “unenforceable as against public policy.” However, now the petitioner has the burden of showing that she withdrew her initial petition on the grounds that the fees were discouraging to continue the arbitration.

 

Respondent appealed on the grounds that petitioner was financially capable of paying half of the fees, at the time of the filing the complaint.

 

Order modified, without costs, by remitting to Supreme Court, New York County, for further

proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.

 

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

To read about more Article 78 cases go to http://www.sheerinlaw.com/?id=78.

Arbitration decision regarding BTA FMLA leave upheld

Matter of Bridge & Tunnel Officers Benevolent Association v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authority

In January 2005, the Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Association changed its policy and required employees to substitute paid annual leave for FMLA leave. Prior to this, petitioner allowed employees to choice whether to take FMLA leave paid or unpaid. The Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority then filed a grievance arguing that the new requirement violated its members’ rights under the collective bargaining agreement.

The grievance went to arbitration where the arbitrator sustained the grievance but left it to both parties to come up with a compromise that would take into account the needs of both, and retained his jurisdiction to provide a solution if they failed at doing so. In May 2006, the arbitrator directed that respondent could require an employee to charge up to 25% of his accrued annual vacation leave for FMLA leave purposes before giving him the option of taking unpaid FMLA leave. This decision was then appealed and modified in Supreme Court which then led to this review.

The Court impermissibly substituted its judgment and interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement by modifying the arbitrator’s May 2006 determination. The arbitrator’s decision was not irrational and thus should not have been modified.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision modifying the May 2006 arbitration award without costs, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.

Read the full article here.

Arbitration agreement in CBA violates Civil Service Law

                          City of Long Beach v. Civil Service Employees Association

This Court of Appeals case centered on whether or not issues submitted by the Civil Service Employees Association were subject to arbitration.

This the history of the case includes a report issued by the New York State Civil Service Commission in the year 2004 noting that Long Beach had poor control over its provisional appointments in the civil service. Most importantly several positions in the competitive class have been filled with provisional appointments and one had been filled provisionally for a total of 19 years.

The city determined that the provisional appointments violated Civil Service Law and terminated the employees. The CSEA filed grievances and demanded arbitration alleging that the employees were tenured.

The city brought an action to stop the arbitration. The Supreme Court granted the motion to stay the arbitration and the Appellate Division affirmed. Their reasoning behind the decision is that a provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement to arbitrate these disputes violated Civil Service Law.

Citing Civil Service Law section 65 (1) the court found that provisional appointments are allowed when there is no eligible list available for filling a vacancy in a competitive class and then for only a maximum of nine months. Furthermore, once a provisional employee has been in a position four months the City must hold a Civil Service examination. Section 65 allows no tenure to provisional employees and the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the C. S. E.A. is meaningless in light of the Civil Service Law.