Two Separate Article 78 Petitions Filed to Overturn a Special-Use-Permit Ruling in Russia, NY

Both parties have started separate legal proceedings to have the Town Land Use Board of Appeal decision thrown out. The Land Use Board of Appeals determined which ruled that the “addition of an asphalt batch plant to a nonconforming quarry is an expansion of mining and requires a special use permit from the Planning Board of the town of Russia.” 

The first petition was filed in early March by 14 residents living near the proposed asphalt plant. The “citizens’ petition” is requesting the court prevent the town planning board from making a decision based on the appeals board’s determination. Also, they are requesting that Respondents, Material Sand and Troy Sand and Gravel, be prohibited from constructing and operating a plant there.

The second petition, “the company’s petition,” was filed on behalf of Material Sand and Troy Sand and Gravel requesting that the Land Use Board of Appeals’ decision be dismissed due to “pre-existing nonconforming use consisted not only of ‘mining’ bt also related aggregate product manufacturing” and for the court to allow the construction of an asphalt plant without the issuance of a special use permit.

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3020-a Morrell v. DOE

In the Matter of Renee Morrell v. New York City Department of Education

 

Pursuant to CPLR 7511 and Education Law § 3020-A, Petitioner sought to vacate the findings and recommendations made by a hearing officer regarding her employment as a tenured teacher. The hearing officer found Petitioner guilty of disciplinary charges that were filed against her by the BOE, which served as just cause for termination.

 

Petitioner, Renee Morrell, has been teaching in the NYC public school system since 1993. In 2005-2006, Petitioner was working at P.S. M197. In May 2006, the school principal received a report regarding Morrell involvement in a physical altercation with a sixth grade male student. The case was referred to OSI.

 

OSI, then, interviewed the same people and substantiated that Petitioner had “punched and kicked” the student during a physical altercation. The Department of Education (DOE) charged Morrell with violating Chancellor’s Regulation A-420. “Chancellor’s Regulation A-420 enforces Department of Education Bylaws and includes reporting requirements established under Regulations of the Commissioner concerning the use of physical force upon a student for punishment purposes.

 

Once DOE received OSI results, DOE initiated a mandatory arbitration proceeding against Petitioner. Morrell’s charges included “…violation of Chancellor's Regulation A-420; just cause for disciplinary action pursuant to Education Law 3020-a; conduct unbecoming respondent's position or conduct prejudicial to the good order, efficiency or discipline of the service; substantial cause rendering respondent unfit to properly perform her obligations to the service; neglect of duty; and just cause for termination.”

 

There was a pre-hearing held on June 22, 2009 and six hearings from then until October 19, 2009. On May 2, 2010, the hearing officer made a written Opinion and Award stating that Petitioner “…is guilty as charged in Specification 1 insofar as on May 15, 2006, the Petitioner struck Student E.R. during a physical altercation, as well as pushed him into a wall (causing him to hit his head), sat on him, and shook him up and down.” Morrell’s conduct violates Chancellor's Regulation A-420 and results in just cause for termination.

 

Morrell received a copy of the finding and recommendation of the hearing officer from the Teacher Tenure Hearing Unit if the New York State Department of Education in a letter dated May 12, 2010. The letter informed Petitioner that she has the right to make an application to the court requesting to vacate or modify the decision

 

Education Law § 3020 oversees discipline of tenured teachers. For instance, any charges brought against a tenured teacher are first subjected to compulsory arbitration before a single hearing officer. “Education Law section 3020-a(5) provides that judicial review of a hearing officer's findings must be conducted pursuant to CPLR 7511. Under such review, an award may only be vacated on a showing of misconduct, bias, excess of power
or procedural defects. Nevertheless, where the parties have submitted to compulsory arbitration, judicial scrutiny is stricter than for a determination rendered where the parties have submitted to voluntary arbitration. The determination must be in accord with due process and supported by adequate evidence, and must also be rational and satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standards of CPLR article 78. The party challenging an arbitration determination has the burden of showing its invalidity.”

 

Petitioner brought forth four contentions. First, Petitioner believes the arbitration award should be vacated due to untimeliness. According to the collective bargaining agreement, a hearing based on allegations of extreme misconduct should be completed within two to three months. Morrell’s hearing took place over an eight month period, from June 22, 2009 to February 5, 2010. Education Law § 3020-a states that the final hearing in a matter must be completed within sixty days from the pre-hearing conference and a decision must be made within thirty days of the final hearing. Petitioner’s decision was submitted 86 days after the final hearing date.

 

Although Morrell’s first contention is within Education Law § 3020, she still needed to demonstrate that she experienced form undue injustice as a result of the alleged delay. Petitioner was unable to show this; therefore the court decided her first contention is without merit.

 

Petitioner’s second contention is that she believes Respondent did not have a probably cause hearing as state in the collective bargaining agreement. When an employee is accused of serious misconduct, the employee would be removed from their position for not more than two month without pay. This can only happen after a finding by a “probable cause arbitrator”. Morrell does not dispute that she was ever suspended without
pay, as permitted by Article 21(G)(5) of the collective bargaining agreement and Respondent affirms “…that the contractual provisions relating to serious misconduct were not invoked by DOE or the hearing officer. Accordingly, the court finds that the provision does not apply to the facts of this proceeding.”

 

Morell’s third contention states that Respondent did not hold a expedited hearing as stated in the collective bargaining agreement. Respondent sought to terminate Petitioner from her position; therefore they were not required to hold an expedited hearing. Article 21(G)(3) of the CBA refers only to suspension, not termination.

 

Petitioner's last contention is that the arbitrator failed to direct respondent to furnish the student's record so that it could be entered into evidence. Article 21(G)(8) of the CBA states the discovery procedures for arbitration cases. This statue leaves the matter of furnishes the student records at the discretion of the hearing officer. Therefore, Petitioner needs to show that the hearing officer abused his discretion. Petitioner failed to do so.

 

The court concluded by denying the petition to vacate Respondent’s decision to terminate Morrell. The court found that the Respondent’s decision was made in accord with due process and maintained by sufficient evidence. Moreover, the court found “…that the decision was rational and satisfied the arbitrary and capricious standards of CPLR article 78.” Therefore, Petitioner has not met her burden of providing evidence of the invalidity of the arbitration determination. The proceeding was dismissed without costs and disbursements.

 

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

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Application for Pistol License Denied Due to Criminal History

Application for Pistol License Denied Due to Criminal History

In the Matter of Ralph Velez, Jr. v Robert M DiBella

Pursuant to Article 78, petitioner appealed a determination by the respondent denying his application for a pistol license.

According to Penal Law § 400.00(1), to be eligible for a pistol license, the applicant must be at least 21 years of age, have good moral character with no prior felony convictions or any other serious offense and there must be no good cause for denial of the license. Also, the pistol licensing officer may use his broad discretion and deny any applicant for any good cause.

Due to the petitioner’s criminal history, which consisted of six arrests and a conviction for disorderly conduct, the respondent determined that good cause existed to deny his application. Even though five of the six arrests were dismissed or resolved, the respondent still considered the circumstances surrounding each arrest.

Petitioner claims that the respondent acted improperly handing over his decision-making authority to the Westchester Department of Public Safety. However, the Westchester Department of Public Safety only provided the respondent with a recommendation of denial. In the respondent’s written decision, it clearly shows that the Department’s recommendation was not the sole basis for denying the petitioner’s application for a pistol license.

The court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding without costs or disbursements.

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Petition Annulled Due to Illegal Stop

 

In the Matter of Kyle P. McDonell v New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, et al.

In this Article 78 proceeding, petitioner asked the court to review a determination suspending his license for refusal to submit to a chemical test.

McDonell was stopped by a NYS Trooper because he accelerated while turning onto an entrance ramp for an interstate highway causing his vehicle to fishtail. The Trooper’s sole basis for stopping McDonell was his belief that McDonell violated VTL § 1162. This law forbids dangerously moving a stopped, standing or parked vehicle unless it can be made with safety. Petitioner was taken into custody because of the Trooper’s belief that the petitioner was under the influence while operating the vehicle. Soon thereafter, because the petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test, his license was suspended.

VTL § 1194 (2) (c), in a refusal revocation hearing, the law judge concluded that the Trooper lawfully arrested the petitioner. However, the court agreed with the petitioner’s contention that he had not been stopped, standing or parked before the Trooper stopped the vehicle. It was held that it was an illegal stop based on VTL § 1162.

The refusal suspension was annulled based on the improper stop.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

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Town's Article 78 Regarding Road Denial Dismissed

 

In the Matter of Eastern Oaks Development v Town of Clinton, et al.

In this Article 78 case, petitioner, Eastern Oaks Development, asked the court to review a decision of Clinton where petitioner was denied their application to have its road accepted for dedication by the Town of Clinton.

In 2005, petitioner applied with the Town of Clinton Planning Board for approval of a residential subdivision that contained eleven lots. Petitioner stated they did not intend to builds any homes on the lots and that it was up to the purchasers to build their own homes. A few months later, the Planning board granted the application for conditional final approval for the Subdivision. Planning Board stated that at least eighty percent of the construction must be done in the Subdivision in order for formal acceptance of the roads.

The Town Engineer wrote a letter to the Board pleading that they disapprove the road based on the fact that there was not eighty percent of construction done in the Subdivision. The Planning Board took this into consideration and declined  acceptance of the road stating that the Town Board disapprove of the dedication “…until there are sufficient houses constructed on the subdivision parcels.”

Petitioner, then commenced this Article 78 proceeding alleging the following: (1) the Town was aware that in order to attract potential purchasers it was necessary for the Town and Town Board to accept the dedication of the road; (2) before an actual vote took place, the Town Board already determined that they were going to decline the acceptance of the road by the influence of Budd, who had a interest of conflict; (3) Budd and the Town Engineer were good friends and they “collaborated and conspired to thwart the perfunctory approval of the road…”; (4) after a dispute between Eastern and Budd, Eastern has a dispute with the Town Engineer “... over baseless charges and has been advised that same threatened the Subdivision."

The Court denied the Town Parties motion to dismiss holding that Budd, although recused from the vote could have influenced it.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

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NYPD Prior Probationary Service Counts Upon Reinstatement

NYPD Prior Probationary Service Counts Upon Reinstatement

Ward v  Kelly

Petitioner, Michael Ward, sought to annul a decision of the NYPD, to terminate him as a Probationary Police Officer on March 11, 2009.

In July 2006, Petitioner was originally appointed as a probationary police officer. Approximately nineteen months later, Ward resigned from his position in order to join the New York City Fire Department and less than a month later, on February 13, 2008, he resigned from the Fire Department and reapplied to the NYPD on the same day.

When Petitioner reapplied to the NYPD, he was required to sign a document called “Police Officer Terms of Probation,” which states that he was informed that there will be a twenty-four month probationary period. On February 21, 2008, Ward was appointed as a Probationary Police Officer. Upon appointment, Petitioner alleges that his probationary period would only last thirty-two days because he had started his probationary period on his initial appointment into the NYPD.

In December 2008, Petitioner was arrested for assault, menacing and harassment. Eventually, the charges were dropped, but as a Probationary Police Officer, Ward was terminated from the NYPD.

Petitioner argues that his initial probationary period should have been counted towards the two year probationary period, which ended in August 2008. Therefore, this would entitle Ward to a disciplinary hearing before his termination because he was no longer a Probationary Police Officer.

According to the Personnel Rules and Regulations of the City of New York, when “…a probationary employee has been separated from service, for any reason other than fault or delinquency, and is thereafter re-appointed by the same agency, the length of his prior probationary term shall be deducted from his current probationary term.”

The petition was granted and the decision terminating petitioner was vacated and rescinded. Petitioner will also be subject to such other disciplinary procedures applicable to him as a non-probationary police officer from his December 14, 2008 arrest.

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Petition Dismissed Due to Administrative Remedies Not Being Exhausted

Pitts II v City of New York Office of Comptroller

Pursuant to Article 78, petitioner sought the court to review a decision of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) stating that he had violated New York City Health Code.

Petitioner received a violation notice from the DOHMH which cited him for violations of the New York City Health Code. A DOHMH hearing examiner determined that petitioner had two violations and he would be fined $500 total. Petitioner brought suit but failed appeal the decision prior to suit.  Due to the petitioner not exhausting all administrative remedies the Supreme Court granted DOHMH’s motion to dismiss.

The court stated that in order for a proceeding to be litigate in a court of law, petitioner must exhaust all available administrative remedies

The Supreme Court ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

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Court Stands Firmly on Decision to Deny Petitioner's Application for Accidental Disability Retirements Benefits

Matter of Brian A. Herlihy v. Thomas P. DiNapoli, as State Comptroller

In this Article 78 case, the court reviewed a decision of the State Comptroller which denied the petitioner’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits.

In 1995, petitioner started working as a police officer for the Town of Bedford, Westchester County. From 2001 to 2005, petitioner sustained three work related injuries. In 2001, while lifting a speed trailer, petitioner felt a pop in his back. In 2002, he injured his upper back and shoulder while aiding burglary arrest. In 2005, petitioner tripped on a step in the police station while trying to answer the phone and work desk duty.

Two years later, in 2007, Petitioner applied for accidental disability retirement benefits. The application was denied due to none of the incidents encompassed an accident within the meaning of Retirement and Social Security Law § 363. The court confirmed stating that the petitioner bears the burden of proving that his injuries were unintentional. This meant that the injuries were sudden and unusual and completely not linked to ordinary risks of employment.

The court confirmed the initial determination, without costs and dismissed the petition.

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

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Court granted petition, reinstating service credits from Comptroller

Matter of David A. Hoover v Thomas P. DiNapoli, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al.

In this Article 78 case, petitioner sought to rescind a determination of Comptroller terminating petitioner’s service credits in New York State and Local Employees’ Retirement System.

Petitioner received service credit from New York State and Local Employees’ Retirement System between 1988 and 1995 for part time employment as a labor regulations specialist for Erie 1 BOCES. In 2008, the respondent declared new regulation for the Retirement System. The new regulations stated how to classify professional service providers as employees or independent contractors.

 

According to the new regulations, petitioner’s service credits were revoked because he was classified and being an independent contractor and was not entitled to the service credits under the independent contractor title. Petitioner sought reinstatement of his service credits on the grounds that Comptroller improperly applied the new regulations and violated his due process rights. The court granted the petition on the due process claim and order that “… the determination to revoke petitioner’s service credit with Erie 1 BOCES for the years prior to 1995 is vacated and annulled.”

 

Read more about this Article 78 case here.

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Delhi bridge responsibility of town, not village

Supreme Court Justice Molly R. Fitzgerald has ruled that the Woolerton Street Bridge is the responsibility of the town of Delhi, not the village. This case began with an Article 78 filed by the village against the town. Article 78 in this case was used to compel the town to do what they are supposed to do in maintaining the bridge. David Merzif, representing the village cited a similar case involving a bridge in Chestnut Ridge which concluded that a bridge is a span that goes over a stream and the town is responsible for it unless the village voluntarily takes responsibility. Delhi Supervisor Peter Bracci said there will be a special meeting of the Delhi Town Board to discuss the decision and look into starting the appeals process. There is also more debate involving the length of bridge and how it could possibly affect its classification. Lois Ray, chairwoman of the bridge committee, said that the committee is attempting to have the bridge rebuilt to county specifications so that it will become a county bridge, relieving both the town and village of any maintenance responsibility. 

Read full article here.

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For other interesting information in the personal injury file go to www.negligenceatty.com.

Syracuse Basketball star may have to resort to Article 78 to get reinstated

Eric Devendorf, a star shooting guard for the Syracuse University Orangemen basketball team may have to file an Article 78 petition to get a one semester suspension overturned.  Devendorf was found to have violated the Syracuse University Student Code when he hit a female student after a traffic incident.  Members of the basketball team were leaving a campus party when they came upon a car driven by Kimberly Smith another student.  Ms. Smith said Mr. Devendorf struck her in the jaw. 

William Sullivan, Devendorf's attorney, said that his client would file an appeal of his one semester suspension on 12/17/08.  If the appeal is not granted Mr. Sullivan said that he would file an Article 78 petition and seek a stay of the suspension during the course of the Article 78 in the hopes Mr. Devendorf continue to play ball until the case is resolved.  Click here for details.

State Liquor Authority decision modified following Article 78

Cris Place v. NY State Liquor Authority  Appellate Division, First Dept  2008 NY Slip OP 09161

The SLA imposed a $1000 bond forfeiture and a $8,500 civil penalty against the Petiitoner after a hearing which found that marijuana use; after-hours drinking; violation of local laws and ordinances and cabaret activity took place at the accused premises.  The First Department ruled that there was no substantial evidence to support the marijuana accusation but the other charges were backed by substantial evidence.  The Court sent the case back the the SLA for reconsideration of the penalty.  The decision can be found here:  www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09161.htm

Appeal of Southhold Zoning Change Denied

Zupa v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Southhold  Index #29166/06 Appellate Division, Second Department

Zupa appealed Southold's interpretation of the Town Code sect 280-121(A) that the proposed realignment of the dock/marina would not be a change that would render inapplicable the provisions concerning non-conforming uses.  The Court held that the Town Board decision was rational and not arbitrary and capricious.  The appeal was dismissed. Read the decision here:   www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08748.htm

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Article 78 to review Atlantic Yards project denied

The Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal Defense Fund brought this Article 78 to review whether the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) prepared the Respondents New York State Urban Development Corporation failed to take into account the potential traffic impacts from the Atlantic Yards Project. The standard of review was whether the detemination was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, of a violation of lawful procedure (CPLR 7803(3).  The Court held that the FEIS did take into account traffic expected to be generated by the project. Additionally, the traffic analysis was reviewed by the NYC DOT.  Finally, the public trust doctrine was not violated by the plan of locating residential housing on the development project.  The full decision can be found here: www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_03641.htm